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Abstract
We study a Cournot duopoly model with tax evasion and time delay. We prove that if
the marginal production costs of both competing firms are equal then the equilibrium point
is asymptotically stable and independent of time delay. As consequence, our model can not
have bifurcations if the delay, as a parameter, is varied. It further imply that less tax evasion
and higher public revenue can be achieved either by increasing the effectiveness of audits or
by adjusting the penalties for tax evasion.
Introduction
Since its introduction in 1838, the Cournot model [3] has provided abundant cases of study for
both basic and applied research. As time-delay has become an inherent property often needed
when modeling natural phenomena, including economic dynamics, the importance of discussing
a Cournot model with time-delay was recognized decades ago [8]. Recently, it has become an
active research area [4, 6, 7, 10, 11]. In [5], a Cournot oligopoly model with tax evasion was
introduced, and subsequently studied, in the duopoly setting, by other authors [1, 9, 12], where
in addition, the introduction of a time delay was made. The time delay in the Cournot duopoly
model is justified just by considering that a firm in the duopoly enters the market first followed
by the second firm some time later. Besides the two classical variables in the model representing
the production of each firm in the duopoly, the modeling of tax evasion has introduced two new
variables representing the declared revenue upon which tax due is calculated. As consequence,
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opportunities to formulate and study examples of stabilities, bifurcations and instabilities has been
created.
The aim of this paper is to provide conditions for the stability of the equilibrium point of a
Cournot duopoly model with tax evasion and time delay. Furthermore, we verify that the stability
is independent of the delay. Somewhat similar results where obtained in [7, Theorem 4] for a
particular duopoly Cournot model with time delay but without the tax evasion modelling. It turns
out that our conditions, besides including some standard mathematical economics conditions, such
as strict monotonicity and strict convexity of the cost and penalty functions, it requires both firms
in the duopoly to have same marginal production costs and same second derivatives of the cost
functions at the equilibrium point. We emphasize that proofs of our results do not require explicit
formulas of the functions involved, just its mathematical economics conditions. In addition, a
technical condition on the second partial derivatives of the profit functions will be required. It has
been observed [5, Page 723] that this technical condition means that tax evasion alone is likely to
be responsible for a reduction of public funds.
We divide this work in four sections. In Section 1, we present the model and prove some basic
results which will be used in subsequent sections. The main results of the paper are stated and
proved in Section 2. In Section 3 we provide some examples of cost functions and inverse demand
functions which satisfy the conditions of stability presented in the paper. Finally, conclusions are
stated in Section 4.
1 The model
In this section we will define and explain the Cournot model studied in this paper and will also
derive some elementary results needed for later. This Cournot model was originally introduced in
[5]. We begin by letting x1 and x2 denote the quantities produced by each firm in the duopoly, while
z1 and z2 will denote the amount of money each firm declares as revenue to the tax authority.
The inverse demand function p(x), where x = x1 + x2, is a positive, strictly decreasing, twice
differentiable function, that is, p′(x) < 0, and such that
p′(x1 + x2) + xip
′′(x1 + x2) < 0. (1)
The cost function Ci(xi) for each firm will be a positive twice differentiable function with
positive first derivative and nonnegative second derivative, that is, it is an striclty increasing and
convex function. A penalty F (xip(x1 + x2) − zi) is imposed on the i-th firm which is caught
evading taxes; regarded as a function, we assume F to be nonnegative and twice differentiable,
having positive first and second derivatives and such that F (0) = 0. The tax rate and the detection
probabilities are denoted by 0 < σ < 1 and 0 < qi < 1, respectively.
For i = 1, 2, we define the profit function Pi as the sum of two functions. The first addend is
(1− qi)
(
xi p(x1 + x2)− Ci(xi)− σzi
)
,
which represent the probability 1−qi of not being caught evading tax times the result of subtracting
to the income xip(x1 + x2) the cost Ci(xi) and the tax rate paid on the declared income zi ≤
2
xip(x1 + x2). The second addend in the profit function Pi is
qi
(
(1− σ) xi p(x1 + x2)− Ci(xi)− F (xi p(x1 + x2)− zi)
)
,
which represent the probability qi of being caught evading tax times the result of subtracting to
the income xip(x1 + x2) of the ith firm, the cost Ci(xi), the tax rate due σxip(x1 + x2) and a
penalty F (xip(x1 + x2)− zi) on the evaded amount. Hence, we may rewrite the profit function as
Pi = Pi (x1, x2, zi) = (1− qi σ)xi p (x1 + x2)− (1− qi)σzi − Ci(xi)
− qi F (xi p (x1 + x2)− zi) . (2)
The following computations will prove useful throughout the paper.
Lemma 1.1. Let 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2 with i 6= j. The second derivatives of the profit function Pi defined
in (2) are given by the formulas
0 >
∂2Pi
∂xj∂zi
= qi xi p
′ (x1 + x2)F
′′ (xip (x1 + x2)− zi) ,
0 >
∂2Pi
∂z2i
= −qi F
′′ (xip(x1 + x2)− z1) ,
∂2Pi
∂x2i
=
(
1− qi (σ + F
′ (xip(x1 + x2)− zi))
)(
2p′ (x1 + x2) + xip
′′ (x1 + x2)
)
− C ′′i (xi)
− qi (p(x1 + x2) + xip
′(x1 + x2))
2
F ′′(xip(x1 + x2)− zi),
∂2Pi
∂xj∂xi
=
(
1− qi (σ + F
′ (xip(x1 + x2)− zi))
)
(p′(x1 + x2) + xip
′′(x1 + x2))
− qixip
′(x1 + x2) (p(x1 + x2) + xip
′(x1 + x2))F
′′ (xip (x1 + x2)− zi) ,
∂2Pi
∂zi∂xi
= qi (p(x1 + x2) + xip
′(x1 + x2))F
′′ (xip (x1 + x2)− zi) .
Proof. The proof is a straightforward computation, we omit details. The two inequalities follow
from the properties of the functions involved.
Proposition 1.2. The profit functions Pi, as defined in (2), has a maximum at the points xi = x
∗
i ,
zi = z
∗
i , for i = 1, 2, which satisfy the system of four equations(
1− σ
)(
p (x1 + x2) + xi p
′ (x1 + x2)
)
− C ′i(xi) = 0,
σ − qi
(
σ + F ′ (xip(x1 + x2)− zi)
)
= 0. (3)
Proof. For i = 1, 2, the critical points satisfy the following two equations
∂Pi
∂xi
=
(
1− qiσ − qiF
′ (xi p (x1 + x2)− zi)
)(
p(x1 + x2) + xi p
′(x1 + x2)
)
− C ′i(xi) = 0,
∂Pi
∂zi
= −(1− qi)σ + qi F
′(xip(x1 + x2)− zi) = 0.
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From the second equation we obtain σ = qiσ+ qiF
′ (xi p (x1 + x2)− zi) and substituting this σ in
the first equation we obtain the desired equations (3). It only remains to check that the solution
of this system of equations is a maximum. For this purpose, using Lemma 1.1, we verify that
∂2Pi
∂z2i
< 0.
Moreover, we have
∂2Pi
∂z2i
∂2Pi
∂x2i
−
(
∂2Pi
∂xi∂zi
)2
= −qiF
′′ (xip(x1 + x2)− zi )
(
(1− σ)
(
2p′ (x1 + x2)
+ xip
′′ (x1 + x2)
)
− C ′′i (xi)
)
> 0,
is positive since using using condition (1) and the fact that F and C are convex, the factor −qiF
′′
is negative and other factor in the parenthesis is also negative. This completes the proof.
It is possible to rewrite the system of equations (3) in Proposition 1.2 as
(1− σ)
d
dxi
(
xip(x1 + x2)
)
= C ′i(xi)
(1− σ)
d
dxi
(
F (xip(xi + xi)− zi)
)
=
σ (1− qi)
qi
C ′i(xi).
The first equation above states that, at the equilibrium point, the marginal cost and the marginal
profit, after tax, coincide in each firm, as was expected from the theory of Cournot models. The
second equation relates the marginal penalty on the declared amount with the marginal cost.
Combining Lemma 1.1, Proposition 1.2, assumption (1) and the monotonicity and convexity
of the functions involved, we obtain the following.
Corollary 1.3. At the points xi = x
∗
i , zi = z
∗
i where the profit function Pi, as defined in (2),
reaches a maximum, we have
0 <
C ′i(xi)
1− σ
= p (x1 + x2) + xi p
′ (x1 + x2)
Furthermore,
0 <
∂2Pi
∂zi∂xi
=
qi
1− σ
F ′′ (xip (x1 + x2)− zi)C
′
i (xi) ,
0 >
∂2Pi
∂x2i
=
(
1− σ
)(
2p′ (x1 + x2) + xip
′′ (x1 + x2)
)
− C ′′i (xi)
− qi (p(x1 + x2) + xip
′(x1 + x2))
2
F ′′(xip(x1 + x2)− zi),
∂2Pi
∂xj∂xi
=
(
1− σ
)
(p′(x1 + x2) + xip
′′(x1 + x2))
− qixip
′(x1 + x2) (p(x1 + x2) + xip
′(x1 + x2))F
′′ (xip (x1 + x2)− zi) .
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For the delay Cournot duopoly model, we will assume the first firm enters the market first, so
that its profit function remains unchanged, that is
P1 (x1, x2, z1, z2, x1τ , x2τ , z1τ , z2τ ) = P1 (x1, x2, z1, z2) .
For the case of the second firm, its profit function is modified to reflect it enters the market after
a delay τ > 0, so that
P2 (x1, x2, z1, z2, x1τ , x2τ , z1τ , z2τ ) (4)
= (1− q2)
(
x2(t) p (x1τ (t) + x2(t))− C2(x2(t))− σz2(t)
)
+ q2
(
(1− σ) x2(t) p (x1τ (t) + x2(t))− C2(x2(t))− F
(
x2(t) p (x1τ (t) + x2(t))− z2(t)
))
.
Let ~x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), z1(t), z2(t)) and let ~xτ (t)=(x1τ (t), x2τ (t), z1τ (t), z2τ (t)) where xiτ (t) =
xi(t − τ) and ziτ (t) = zi(t − τ). Denote constants k1, k2, k3, k4 > 0. To create our dynamical
system, we assume
dxi
dt
= ki
∂Pi
∂xi
and
dzi
dt
= ki+2
∂Pi
∂zi
.
The delay Cournot duopoly with tax evasion is then
d~x
dt
=
(
k1
∂P1
∂x1
(~x, ~xτ ), k2
∂P2
∂x2
(~x, ~xτ ), k3
∂P1
∂z1
(~x, ~xτ ), k4
∂P2
∂z2
(~x, ~xτ )
)
. (5)
Notice that the fixed points of this dynamical system (5) is precisely the equilibrium points com-
puted in Proposition 1.2.
Proposition 1.4. The quasi-polynomial associated to the linearization of the delay Cournot
duopoly at its fixed point is given by the formula
Q(λ) = p1 (λ) p2 (λ)− e
−λτg1(λ)g2(λ), (6)
where pi(λ) = λ
2 −
(
ki
∂2Pi
∂x2i
+ ki+2
∂2Pi
∂z2i
)
λ+ ki
∂2Pi
∂x2i
ki+2
∂2Pi
∂z2i
− ki
∂2Pi
∂zi∂xi
ki+2
∂2Pi
∂xi∂zi
,
g1(λ) = k1
∂2P1
∂x2∂x1
λ− k1
∂2P1
∂x2∂x1
k3
∂2P1
∂z21
+ k1
∂2P1
∂z1∂x1
k3
∂2P1
∂x2∂z1
,
and
g2(λ) = k2
∂2P2
∂x1τ∂x2
λ− k2
∂2P2
∂x1τ∂x2
k4
∂2P2
∂z22
+ k2
∂2P2
∂z2∂x2
k4
∂2P2
∂x1τ∂z2
.
Proof. The linealized system is of the form
d~x
dt
= A~x+B~xτ , (7)
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where
A =


k1
∂2P1
∂x21
k1
∂2P1
∂x2∂x1
k1
∂2P1
∂z1∂x1
0
0 k2
∂2P2
∂x22
0 k2
∂2P2
∂z2∂x2
k3
∂2P1
∂x1∂z1
k3
∂2P1
∂x2∂z1
k3
∂2P1
∂z21
0
0 k4
∂2P2
∂x2∂z2
0 k4
∂2P2
∂z22


and B =


0 0 0 0
k2
∂2P2
∂x1τ∂x2
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
k4
∂2P2
∂x1τ∂z2
0 0 0


.
The required quasipolinomial is nothing butQ(λ) = det(A+Be−λτ−λI). A standard computation
verifies the proposition. We omit details.
It will be useful to have conditions for the stability of the Cournot duopoly model when there
is no delay, that is, for τ = 0.
Proposition 1.5. The characteristic polynomial
Q(λ) = p1(λ)p2(λ)− g1(λ)g2(λ)
= λ4 + α3λ
3 + α2λ
2 + α1λ+ α0,
corresponding to the linealization of the Cournot duopoly model (5) without delay is asymptotically
stable if α1 > 0 and α1α2α3 > α
2
1 + α
2
3α0.
Proof. We first observe that the inequalities α0 > 0, α1 > 0 and α1α2α3 > α
2
1 + α
2
3α0 imply
α2α3 > α1+
α23α0
α1
> α1. Therefore, the inequalities α0 > 0 α1 > 0, α3 > 0 and α1α2α3 > α
2
1+α
2
3α0
imply
1
α3
> 0,
α23
α2α3 − α1
> 0,
(α2α3 − α1)
2
α3(α1α2α3 − α21 − α
2
3α0)
> 0 and α0 > 0, which are the Routh-
Hurwitz conditions for the desired result. Thus, in order to establish our proposition, we only
need to verify the two inequalities α0 > 0 and α3 > 0.
To prove α3 > 0, we notice α3 is nothing but the addition of the linear coefficient of p1(λ) plus
the linear coefficient of p2(λ), that is,
α3 = −
2∑
i=1
(
ki
∂2Pi
∂x2i
+ ki+2
∂2Pi
∂z2i
)
> 0,
which is then positive since kj > 0 and, by Lemma 1.1,
∂2Pi
∂x2i
< 0 and
∂2Pi
∂z2i
< 0.
Finally, an application of Proposition 1.4 and Lemma 1.1 allow us to compute
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α0/(k1k2k3k4) =
2∏
i=1
(
∂2Pi
∂x2i
∂2Pi
∂z2i
−
(
∂2Pi
∂zi∂xi
)2)
−
2∏
i=1
(
∂2Pi
∂xi±1∂xi
∂2Pi
∂z2i
−
∂2Pi
∂zi∂xi
∂2Pi
∂xi±1∂zi
)
≥ (1− σ)2
(
2∏
i=1
qiF
′′(xip(x1 + x2)− zi)
)
(
2∏
i=1
(2p′(x1 + x2) + xip
′′(x1 + x2))−
2∏
i=1
(p′(x1 + x2) + xip
′′(x1 + x2))
)
= (1− σ)2
(
2∏
i=1
qiF
′′ (xip(x1 + x2)− zi)
)
p′(x1 + x2)
(
p′(x1 + x2) +
2∑
i=1
(p′(x1 + x2) + xip
′′(xi + x2))
)
> 0.
2 Same marginal production costs
In this section we prove the main result of this paper. We will give conditions for the stability
of the Cournot duopoly model with tax evasion and in fact, we will also show that the stability
won’t be affected by any delay.
As mentioned in the introduction, we first assume the marginal production costs and the second
derivatives of the cost functions on the equilibrium point are equal, that is,
C ′1(x
∗
i ) = C
′
2(x
∗
2) and C
′′
1 (x
∗
1) = C
′′
i (x
∗
2). (8)
The following proposition is a slight generalization of an observation in [5, Page 717].
Proposition 2.1. In the Cournot duopoly model defined in (5), C ′1(x
∗
1) = C
′
2(x
∗
2) if and only if
x∗1 = x
∗
2. Furthermore, q1 = q2 if and only if z
∗
1 = z
∗
2.
Proof. Subtracting the first equation in Proposition 1.2 for i = 1 to i = 2, we obtain
(x∗1 − x
∗
2)p
′(x∗1 + x
∗
2) = 0.
Since p is strictly decreasing we obtain x∗ = x∗1 = x
∗
2. Conversely, if x
∗ = x∗1 = x
∗
2 then using
again the first equation in Proposition 1.2, we obtain
C1(x∗1)
1−σ
= p(2x∗) + x∗p′(2x∗) =
C2(x∗2)
1−σ
and so
C1(x
∗
1) = C2(x
∗
2) For the equality of the zi’s, assuming q1 = q = q2 we now use the second equation
in Proposition 1.2 to obtain
F ′(x∗p(2x∗)− z∗1) =
(1− q1)σ
q1
=
(1− q)σ
q
=
(1− q2)σ
q2
= F ′(x∗p(2x∗)− z∗2)
7
and using that F ′ is strictly increasing we conclude z∗1 = z
∗
2 . Conversely, if z
∗ = z∗1 = z
∗
2 using
again the second equation in Proposition 1.2
(1− q1)σ
q1
= F ′(x∗p(2x∗)− z∗) =
(1− q2)σ
q2
,
which implies q1 = q2, as wanted.
In addition to the hypothesis on the marginal costs, we are going to assume the the probabilities
q = q1 = q2 of being caught evading taxes are the same for both firms. We remark that this
assumption q1 = q2 was also made in the original introduction of the Cournot duopoly model
with tax evasion [5] and also in subsequent works, e.g [12]. In addition, we will assume k1 = k3
and k2 = k4, that is, both firms have the same strategies for adapting their productions and
income declared for tax purposes. Finally, we impose one technical condition on the second
partial derivatives of the profit funtions:
−
∂2P1
∂x21
>
∣∣∣∣ ∂2P1∂x2∂x1
∣∣∣∣ , (9)
where the inequality is on the evaluation at the equilibrium point. For easy reference, we stablish
the following.
Definition 2.2. We define the Cournot duopoly model with equal marginal costs, as the delay
Cournot duopoly model with tax evasion (5) such that conditions (8) and (9) together with the
assumptions q = q1 = q2 and (k1, k3) = (k2, k4).
Proposition 2.3. In the Cournot duopoly model with equal marginal costs given in Definition 2.2,
the inequality p(x1 + x2) + 2x1p
′(x1 + x2) ≥ 0 implies the technical condition (9).
Proof. It will suffice to prove that −∂
2P1
∂x2
1
± ∂
2P1
∂x2∂x1
> 0. Using Corollary 1.3, we compute
−
∂2P1
∂x21
+
∂2P1
∂x2∂x1
= C ′′1 (x1)− (1− σ)p
′(x1 + x2)
+ q1 p(x1 + x2) (p(x1 + x2) + x1p
′(x1 + x2))F
′′(x1p(x1 + x2)− zi)
> 0.
and using the hypothesis we finally obtain
−
∂2P1
∂x21
−
∂2P1
∂x2∂x1
= C ′′1 (x1)− (1− σ)
(
p′(x1 + x2) + 2
(
p′(x1 + x2) + x1p
′′(x1 + x2)
))
+
q1
1− σ
(p(x1 + x2) + 2x1p
′(x1 + x2))F
′′ (x1p(x1 + x2)− zi)C
′
1(x1)
> 0.
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One may wonder if the technical condition (9), stated for the first firm in the duopoly, is valid
for the second firm. That this is the case, under the conditions already described, is a consequence
of the following.
Proposition 2.4. The second derivatives of the profit functions (2) corresponding to the Cournot
duopoly model with equal marginal costs given in Definition 2.2, coincide at the equilibrium point.
Thus, the quasipolinomial corresponding to the linealization of the form (7) reduces to Q(λ) =
p2(λ)− e−τλg2(λ), where p(λ) and g(λ) are second and first degree polynomials, respectively.
Proof. We combine Lemma 1.1, Corollary 1.3 and Proposition 8 together with the assumptions of
the Cournot duopoly model with same marginal costs to obtain the desired result.
The following theorem formalizes the claim that the conditions for the Cournot duopoly model
with equal marginal costs given in Definition 2.2, are sufficient for the equilibrium point to be
asymptotically stable. In particular, they must satisfy the equivalent conditions for the model
presented in [12, Proposition 5].
Theorem 2.5. The equilibrium point of the Cournot duopoly model with equal marginal costs
given in Definition 2.2 is asymptotically stable for τ = 0.
Proof. Using Proposition 2.4, we may assume p(λ) = λ2 +m1λ+m0 and g(λ) = c1λ+ c0, so that
the characteristic polynomial corresponding to the linealization of the Cournot duopoly model
with equal marginal costs and without delay, is
Q(λ) = (λ2 +m1λ+m0)
2 − (c1λ+ c0)
2
= λ4 + 2m1λ
3 + (2m0 +m
2
1 − c
2
1)λ
2 + (2m0m1 − 2c0c1)λ+m
2
0 − c
2
0
= λ2 + α3λ
3 + α2λ
2 + α1λ+ α0.
According to Proposition 1.5, we only need to verify that α1 > 0 and α1α2α3 > α
2
1 + α
2
3α0. First,
we combine the formulas in Lemma 1.1 and Proposition 1.4 to obtain
m0 = −c0 − q1k1k3p
′(x1 + x2)F
′′ (x1p(x1 + x2)− z1) + q1k1k3C
′′(x1)F
′′ (x1p(x1 + x2)− z1)
= −c0 + r,
where r > 0 and
−c0 = k1
∂2P1
∂x2∂x1
k3
∂2P1
∂z21
− k1
∂2P1
∂z1∂x1
k3
∂2P1
∂x2∂z1
= −q1k1k3(1− σ)
(
p(x1 + x2) + x1p
′(x1 + x2)
)
F ′′ (x1p(x1 + x2)− z1)
> 0.
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On the other hand, we have
m1 = −k1
∂2P1
∂x21
− k3
∂2P1
∂z21
> −k1
∂2P1
∂x21
= −c1 + q1k1(p(x1 + x2) + x1p
′(x1 + x2))p(x1 + x2)F
′′(x1p(x1 + x2)− z1)
− (1− σ)k1p
′(x1 + x2) + k1C
′′
1 (x1)
> −c1.
Thus
m0m1 = (−c0 + r)m1 > (−c0)m1 > (−c1)(−c0) = c0c1.
Hence
α1 = 2(m0m1 − c0c1) > 0.
Finally, the technical condition (9) gives us
m1 = −k1
∂2P1
∂x21
− k3
∂2P1
∂z21
> k1
∣∣∣∣ ∂2P1∂x2∂x1
∣∣∣∣
= |c1|.
so that m21 − c
2
1 > 0. Thus, we compute
α3α2α1 = (2m1)(2m0 +m
2
1 − c
2
1)(2m0m1 − 2c0c1)
= (2m1)(2m0)(2m0m1 − 2c0c1) + (2m1)(m
2
1 − c
2
1)(2m0m1 − 2c0c1)
= 4m20m
2
1 − 8m0m1c0c1 + 4c
2
0c
2
1 + 4m
2
0m
2
1 − 4c
2
0c
2
1 + (2m1)(m
2
1 − c
2
1)(2m0m1 − 2c0c1)
= α21 + 4m
2
1(m
2
2 − c
2
0) + 4m
2
1c
2
0 − 4c
2
0c
2
1 + (2m1)(m
2
1 − c
2
1)(2m0m1 − 2c0c1)
= α21 + α
2
3α0 + (m
2
1 − c
2
1)
(
4c20 + α3(m
2
1 − c
2
1)α1
)
> α21 + α
2
3α0,
as was to be proved.
Proposition 2.6. The quasipolinomial (6) corresponding to the linealization (7) of the Cournot
duopoly model with equal marginal costs given in Definition 2.2 does not have imaginary roots.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose λ = iω, ω 6= 0, is an imaginary root of Q(λ) = p2(λ)−eiωτg2(λ).
Since p(λ) and g(λ) are polynomials with real coefficients, the imaginary roots of the quasipoly-
nomial Q(λ) occur in conjugate pairs. Therefore, we may assume without loss of generality that
ω > 0. We first observe that
|p(iω)| = |g(iω)| . (10)
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On the other hand, by the technical condition (9)
1
w
Im(p(iw)) = −k1
∂2P1
∂x21
− k2
∂2P1
∂z21
> k1
∂2P1
∂x21
> k1
∣∣∣∣ ∂2Pi∂xj∂xi
∣∣∣∣
=
1
w
|Im (g(iω))| .
Furthermore
Re(p(iw)) = k1
∂2Pi
∂x2i
k2
∂2Pi
∂z2i
− k1
∂2Pi
∂zi∂xi
k2
∂2Pi
∂xi∂zi
− w2
> k1
∂2Pi
∂x2i
k3
∂2Pi
∂z2i
− k1
∂2Pi
∂zi∂xi
k3
∂2Pi
∂xi∂zi
> k1
∂2P1
∂x2∂x1
k3
∂2P1
∂z21
− k1
∂2P1
∂z1∂x1
k3
∂2P1
∂x2∂z1
= −c0
= |Re (g(iω))| .
The inequalities above give us
|p(iω)|2 = Re(p(iw))2 + Im(p(iw))2
> |Re (g(iω))|2 + |Im (g(iω))|2
= |g(iω)|2.
Hence |p(iω)| > |g(iω)|, a contradiction of (10). This completes the proof.
We have proved in Theorem 2.5 that the equilibrium point of the Cournot duopoly model with
equal marginal costs is asymptotically stable for τ = 0, and in the previous Proposition 2.6 we
showed that the quasipolynomial corresponding to its linealization does not have imaginary roots.
Therefore, there are no roots of the quasipolynomial which cross the imaginary axis as the value
of the delay τ increases. As consequence, see e.g. [2], we have obtained the following theorem, the
main result of our paper.
Theorem 2.7. The equilibrium point of the Cournot duopoly model with equal marginal costs
given in Definition 2.2 is asymptotically stable and independent of the delay.
Remark 2.8. As a direct consequence of the above theorem, we can assure that the Cournot
duopoly model with equal marginal costs does not have bifurcations under parametric variations of
the delay τ ≥ 0.
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3 Examples
In this section we will provide some examples which satisfy the conditions for the Cournot duopoly
model with equal marginal costs given in Definition 2.2. As motivation, let us observe that in case
the proposed conditions are satisfies then the system of equations (3) can be rewritten as
p(2x∗) + x∗p′(2x∗) =
C ′1(x
∗)
1− σ
(11)
F ′(x∗p(2x∗)− z∗) =
σ(1− q)
q
(12)
If G = F ′ then G is strictly increasing by definition of F , so that solving for z∗ in Equation (12)
we obtain
z∗ = x∗p(2x∗)−G−1
(
σ(1− q)
q
)
.
Thus, the amount z∗ declared as revenue by the firms in the duopoly will be closer to their
actual revenue x∗p(2x∗) either when the effectiveness of audits is increased, that is, the value of q
representing the probability of being caught evading taxes increases, or by adjusting the penalties
for tax evasion, that is, introducing a penalty function such that the value of G−1 at σ(1−q)
q
is
as low as possible. In addition, Theorem 2.7 assures that the equilibrium point of our model is
asymptotically stable and independent of time delay.
We will next provide a family of cost functions which satisfy condition (8) and two examples of
inverse demand functions which allow the profit functions to satisfy the desired technical condition
(9). Thus, for our examples, the penalty function F does not affect the stability of the system.
3.1 Examples of cost functions
Let us assume the cost function, for i = 1, 2, is given by the formula Ci(xi) = fi+dxi+ cx
2
i , where
fi ≥ 0, d > 0 and c ≥ 0 are constants. We claim that this functions satisfy condition (8). Indeed,
subtracting the first equation of the system (3) for i = 2 from i = 1 we obtain
(1− σ)(x∗1 − x
∗
2)p
′(x∗1 + x
∗
2) = 2c(x
∗
1 − x
∗
2).
By contradiction, if x∗1 6= x
∗
2 then the above equation implies p
′(x∗1 + x
∗
2) =
2c
1−σ
≥ 0, contradicting
p′(x) < 0. An application of Proposition 2.1 completes the proof of the claim.
3.2 Examples of inverse demand functions
We now provide examples of inverse demand functions p(x) which satisfy the inequality p(2x∗) +
2x∗p′(2x∗) ≥ 0 which, according to Proposition 2.3, implies the desired desired technical condi-
tion (9). We claim that the functions p1(x) = 1/x and p2(x) = a− bx with a, b > 0, both do. For
the first function, we compute
p1(2x
∗) + 2x∗p′1(2x
∗) =
1
2x∗
−
2x∗
4(x∗)2
= 0,
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as desired. Finally, for the second function p2(x), we solve Equation (11) to obtain x
∗ = a
3b
−
C′
1
(x∗)
3b(1−σ)
.
Therefore, using the cost function from previous subsection, we get x∗ = a(1−σ)−d
3b(1−σ)+2c
. Since the
inequality p2(2x
∗) + 2x∗p′2(2x
∗) ≥ 0 is equivalent to the inequality a− 4bx∗ ≥ 0, we substitute the
value of x∗ and obtain
2ac+ 4bd ≥ ab (1− σ) ,
which is the desired condition for stability.
4 Conclusions
In this paper a stability analysis of a Cournot duopoly model with tax evasion under parametric
variations of the delay is presented. As consequence of this analysis, we give conditions for the
equilibrium point of the above model to be delay-independent and asymptotically stable. In
particular, there are no bifurcations under parametric variations of the time-delay, in other words,
under the given conditions, the equilibrium point of the duopoly can not be made unstable by a late
insertion of the second firm of the duopoly in the market. Evidently, our conditions for stability
are not necessary, as examples in the literature show [12, Section 5]; however, our conditions for
stability are surprisingly simple and apply for a variety of classical functions found in the literature,
as was exhibited in previous section.
Under the proposed assumptions, we are able to suggest that either by increasing the effec-
tiveness of audits or by adapting the penalties for tax evasion it may result in the rise of the
tax revenue, more precisely, in the declared amount of revenue to the tax authority, which is
asymptotically stable, thus inhibiting tax evasion and increasing public revenue.
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